Supplemental Materials to:

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

November 29, 2018

These supplemental materials to "Polarization, Legislative Constraint, and Executive Policymaking in the United States" include a number of results noted in the paper, robustness checks and additional models noted in the paper. Below is a table of contents for this document.

1. Summary of coding procedures for determining policy and administrative significance of executive orders.

2. Summary statistics of all executive order frequency in the U.S. states. Summary of executive order usage after omitting ceremonial executive orders and executive order usage after omitting ceremonial and disaster related orders (Table A1).

3. Summary statistics of legislator staff and salaries by state (Table A2).

4. Summary statistics of all independent variables included in regression models (Table A3).

5. Table of the distribution of key variables under unified and divided government (Table A4).

6. Figures showing the number of executive orders in each state and year and corresponding periods of divided versus unified government (Figures A1-A2).

7. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but excluding ceremonial and pardon executive orders (Table A5).

8. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but exclude disaster-related executive orders (Table A6).

9. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but include all executive orders, regardless of topic or function (Table A7).

10. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but include governor and year fixed effects rather than state and year fixed effects (Table A8).

11. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but exclude Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Texas. We exclude these states because they treat executive orders differently legislatively and legally than the remaining states. In Georgia and Florida executive orders are used to make appointments. Kentucky governors use executive orders for a wide range of perfunctory executive actions, such as the approval of contracts, making this a perhaps more expansive and different tool than in other states. Executive orders fail to have any clear legal status in Pennsylvania. Finally, few executive orders are issued in Texas at all and even fewer are used for substantive purposes. However, as shown here, excluding them does not substantially change the results presented in the main paper (Table A9).

12. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but dropping 1993 due to concerns over how certain elements are coded prior to 1994 (Krupnikov and Shipan 2012). We construct our measure by taking the average score of those four indices for each available state-year. We exclude factors, such as organizational power and election procedures, that were not consistently available across time. Furthermore, we exclude gubernatorial party control since we use the partisanship of the governor as a separate independent variable. The four remaining factors were measured in 1948, 1960, 1966, 1968, 1980, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007. We use linear interpolation to fill in the gaps between years in our dataset. Post-2007, we continue the trend from 2005-2007 (Table A10).

13. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) using alternative measures of polarization. We include the difference in party medians in the states' upper chambers and the average of the lower and upper chambers. We also test a measure of polarization based on campaign finance data (Bonica 2014). Following Battista (2009), we also use the standard deviation of the chamber ideologies and a measure of the standard deviation of the majority party ideologies. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A11).

14. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but include third party governors. We code these instances as being divided government given the lack of a partisan affiliation of the governor. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A14).

15. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but omit states with short panels. Here we only include states where there are 10 or more years of executive order data. Given the within state and year identification strategy, we want to ensure that the data are sufficient for such identification. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A15).

16. Replication of the results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 in the paper (Tables 1 and 2) but using 38 states over a 13 year period from 2000 to 2013 for a complete, balanced panel. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A16).

17. Regression results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 using a variety of additional control variables. Specifically, we include a measure of the number of years a governor has been in office, a measure of the state's annual expenditures, the size of the governor's party in the legislature, and a lagged dependent variable. Using these alternative measures, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A17).

18. Regression results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 using an OLS model rather than a negative binomial model. Because of the OLS specification, we also take the natural log of the number of executive orders as the dependent variable. Using these alternative measures, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A18).

19. Regression results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 using a different coding of divided government. Here we consider divided government to be only cases in which both chambers of the legislature are opposed to the governor. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A19).

20. Regression results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 that include a measure of majority party agenda power in the state. We take this measure from Anzia and Jackman (2012). Since this measure does not vary across time, we cannot include it in a model with state fixed effects. Thus, we use a correlated random effects model here. Using this alternative measure, we find the same results as in the main paper (Table A20).

21. Regression results testing Hypothesis 1 thru 3 that consider different configurations of divided government, legislative polarization, and legislative rule review. (Table A21).

22. We present a figures showing the distribution of polarization among divided government and unified government (Figure A3).

23. We present three figures showing that omitting any particular state from the analysis does not change the results reported in the paper. In each model we omit one state from the analysis. The results show that no particular state is instrumental in driving the results presented in the main paper (Figure A4).

24. We present two figures showing trends in polarization by state (Figure A7 and A8).

1 Coding Executive Orders

In order to collect data on gubernatorial executive orders, we relied on a number of sources. First, we searched through collections of executive orders maintained online through state registers, governmental websites, and historical archives. We collected information on every executive order issued for all available years, including the issuance date, title, description, number, and issuing governor.[1] Second, we searched through Lexis Nexis Academic to collect information for executive orders any additional state-years not available on the previously mentioned websites as well as any missing information we could not gather from these other sources. Specifically, we searched through each available state's register, administrative code, or analogous publication for the phrase "executive order." From these results, we identified the documents that were actually executive orders for that state and recorded the appropriate information.[2]

Third, from both the governmental website and Lexis Nexis searches, we compiled a list of all executive orders from every state and year available. We closely examined this list and dropped state years in which it appeared to be missing executive orders that could not be identified.[3] Fourth, we read through the titles and descriptions (and in some cases the full texts) of each executive order to categorize them in various, non-mutually exclusive, categories based on their functions. The following includes the descriptions of each category and how we coded them accordingly:

Ceremonial: An order is coded as ceremonial if it deals with a non-substantive, purely symbolic topic. Examples include the lowering of federal and state flags to mourn a death or tragic event (e.g. New Jersey E.O. 87 issued by Chris Christie on February 15, 2012 to mourn the death of Whitney Houston), commemoration of an historic event (e.g. Arizona E.O. 10-18 issued by Jan Brewer on September 10, 2010 to commemorate the anniversary of 9-11), naming of a highway (e.g. Alabama E.O. 39 issued by Fob Jones on December 3, 1997 to name a highway after Jim Whitaker), or declaring a holiday (e.g. Michigan E.O. 2004-30 issued by Jennifer Granholm on May 27, 2004 recognizing Veterans' Day). This category represents 6.3% of all executive orders.

Disaster: An order is coded as disaster if it relates to reacting to a natural disaster such as a tornado, hurricane, blizzard, wildfire, or flood. Examples include the declaration of a state disaster emergency (e.g. Florida E.O. 6-200 issued by Jeb Bush on August 27, 2006 to declare a state of emergency due to Hurricane

[1] Note, every state did have some associated website with available executive order data, although the breadth of coverage of its available data varied substantially in some cases across states.

[2] The executive order data through Lexis Nexis Academic generally was available beginning in 1995.

[3] This was typically determined tracking the executive orders by sequential numbering.

Ernesto), ending a state of emergency (e.g. Florida E.O. 6-210, September 11, 2006 that ends the state of emergency for Hurricane Ernesto), or extending a state of emergency (e.g. Missouri E.O. 6-50 issued by Matt Blunt, December 28, 2006 extending the state of emergency due to severe storms). This category also includes orders related to state efforts to assist in disaster relief such as several evacuation orders, suspension of regulations and emergency funds issued by Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This category represents 6.8% of all executive orders.

Pardon: An order is coded as a pardon if it relates to the governor pardoning of an individual from their crime (e.g. Indiana E.O. 15-1 issued by Mike Pence on January 9, 2015 pardoning Stephanie Davis) or commuting their sentence (e.g. Oklahoma E.O. 2001-16 issued by Frank Keating on April 9, 2001 that commutes the death sentence of Phillip Dewitt Smith to life in prison without parole). This can also include a stay of execution for an individual on the state's death row (e.g. Missouri E.O. 99-8 issued by Mel Carnahan on September 23, 1999 as a stay of execution for Steven Parkus). This category represents 1% of all executive orders.

Routine Administrative: This category is related to executive orders that relate to routine administrative tasks within the executive branch, This can include extending the life of or expanding the membership of an advisory commission (e.g. Colorado E.O. B-2013-009 issued by John Hickenlooper on October 1, 2013 to extend the Colorado Governor's Council for Physical Fitness), scheduling a special election (e.g. Wisconsin E.O. 11-31 issued by Scott Walter on May 24, 2011 order special election to fill a vacancy in the state house of representatives), closing of state offices for a holiday (e.g. South Dakota E.O. 2003-8 issued by Michael Rounds on October 22, 2003 to close state offices on Good Friday), state employee pay raises (e.g. Louisiana E.O. KBB 07-15 issued by Kathleen Blanco on July 18, 2007), or policies on employment leaves of absence and benefits (e.g. Hawaii E.O. 11-25 issued by Neil Abercrombie on December 1, 2011). Additionally, Florida made several specific case assignments to attorney generals through executive order, while Georgia issued several orders to fill vacancies and technical corrections to previous orders that were all also coded as routine administrative. This category represents 17.8% of all executive orders.

For the reasons elaborated in the paper, we choose to isolate orders related to substantive policy. Thus our dependent variable would be the sum of all executive orders in every state-year, excluding those orders in the ceremonial, pardon, and routine administrative categories. By excluding these categories, we are left with a collection of executive orders that deal with substantive policy issues having implications for outcomes within the state.

For example, many executive orders are used to create brand new state policy initiatives (e.g. Illinois E.O. 14 issued by Governor Pat Quinn on December 10, 2010 created a new coastal management program, specifying its objectives and designating agencies to implement the policy). A common gubernatorial strategy is to create a new executive governing body to manage a new policy initiative, both created within the same executive order. For example, Governor Ben Nelson created the Nebraska Transportation Industry Task Force to oversee its newly created Transportation Efficiency Project in E.O. 95-3 issued on February 8, 1995. Governors also commonly use executive orders to give instructions to agencies on how to implement existing law. For example, Governor Mark Dayton of Minnesota issued an executive order to guide the implementation Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program, established in the previous year by the state legislature (E.O. 14-19, April 9, 2014). Furthermore, other substantive executive orders can deal with the allocation of funds for certain projects (e.g. Oklahoma E.O. 2010-26 issued by Brad Henry on June 10, 2010 which allocated funds for education programs) and the delegation of authority to agencies (e.g. Kansas E.O. 1998-02 issued by Bill Graves on April 1, 1998 delegating rule making authority to the Kansas Adjutant General). Overall, substantive orders represents 73.5% of all executive orders.

Table A1: Executive Order Summary Statistics by State

	All EOs		Exclude Ceremonial		Exclude Ceremonial, Pardon, Routine Admin		
State	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Years
Alabama	11.89	7.94	11.11	7.89	11.05	7.91	1996–2013
Alaska	1.35	1.90	1.35	1.90	1.35	1.90	1995–2013
Arizona	18.61	7.82	18.5	7.88	17.77	7.26	1996–2013
Arkansas	17	-	17.0	-	17	-	2008
California	14.4	7.80	14.2	7.68	14.06	7.67	1999–2013
Colorado	29.53	11.77	29.18	11.82	26.88	11.61	1997–2013
Connecticut	6.25	4.67	6.06	4.64	5.87	4.66	1996–2013
Delaware	11.29	5.90	10.82	5.80	10.41	5.07	1997–2013
Florida	256.8	45.75	256	45.62	48.53	19.05	1998–2013
Georgia	430.0	103.80	422.64	103.99	408.36	102.60	2003–2013
Hawaii	28.93	21.47	28.93	21.47	25.71	23.07	1998–2013
Idaho	16.33	8.84	16.06	8.93	13.72	7.75	1996–2013
Illinois	9.94	6.28	9.67	6.33	9.5	6.23	1996–2013
Indiana	28.38	12.63	15.31	9.60	13.38	7.92	1999–2013
Iowa	5.94	2.98	5.88	3.01	5.56	3.08	1996–2012
Kansas	14.0	10.71	13.53	10.39	12.59	9.70	1996–2013
Kentucky	-	-	-	-	-	-	2012–2013
Louisiana	54.06	27.10	52.67	27.59	51.44	26.65	1996–2013
Maine	16.67	7.63	16.56	7.55	16.55	7.55	2003–2013
Maryland	6.72	3.01	6.67	3.01	6.5	2.81	1996–2013
Massachusetts	9.07	4.01	8.93	4.08	8.73	4.10	1995–2013
Michigan	20.38	11.28	19.69	10.87	16.69	7.28	1996-2013
Minnesota	17.87	6.12	17.8	6.07	17.67	5.85	1995-2013
Mississippi	10.94	5.76	7.89	3.77	7.5	3.81	1996-2013
Missouri	28.23	11.99	25.92	12.22	22.92	11.66	1996–2008
Montana	19.5	5.87	19.42	5.93	13	4.07	2000–2013
Nevada	27.0	6.0	15.67	4.73	14.33	4.16	2011–2013
New Hampshire	6.44	3.09	6.28	3.04	6.11	3.05	1996-2013
New Jersey	34.61	17.01	19.72	9.52	18.39	9.31	1996–2013
New Mexico	50.67	23.76	43.0	22.54	43 .0	22.54	2011–2013
New York	20.5	12.51	20.33	12.36	20.22	12.30	1996–2013
North Carolina	23.0	8.86	22.84	8.94	20.53	9.32	1995–2013
North Dakota	14.75	12.08	14.5	11.33	14.08	11.57	1998–2013
Ohio	27.07	8.19	27.07	8.19	26.87	8.23	1999–2013
Oklahoma	40.29	11.64	20.53	6.43	19.82	6.43	1996–2013
Oregon	18.82	7.28	18.82	7.28	18.82	7.28	1997–2013
Pennsylvania	9.83	4.79	9.83	4.79	9.17	4.57	1996–2013
Rhode Island	14.07	4.51	14.07	4.51	11.0	4.57	1996-2010
South Carolina	29.0	12.61	27.52	11.80	23.67	10.34	1993–2013
South Dakota	17.11	8.37	15.33	8.36	14.72	8.19	1996–2013
Tennessee	8.0	4.34	8.0	4.34	7.13	4.00	1996–2013
Texas	6.90	4.52	6.48	4.33	5.86	3.89	1993–2013
Utah	12.63	3.53	12.58	3.59	12.21	3.47	1993–2013
Vermont	10.21	3.95	10.11	3.81	8.42	3.39	1995–2013
Virginia	21.19	11.12	21.19	11.12	19.5	11.25	1997–2013
Washington	5.38	2.36	5.38	2.36	5.19	2.54	1993–2013
West Virginia	16.65	6.47	14.06	5.74	11.71	5.16	1996–2013
Wisconsin	36.95	9.49	19.16	5.89	15.05	4.34	1995–2013
Wyoming	5.18	1.94	5.06	1.95	4.35	1.77	1996–2013

Data on executive orders are collected from various state governmental websites and registrars. The regression models in the main paper use the DV that excludes ceremonial, pardon, and routine administrative orders.

Table A2: Legislative and Executive Summary Statistics by State

State	Staff Mean	Staff SD	Salary Mean	Salary SD	GIP Mean	GIP SD
AK	293.02	36.07	26330.03	9627.20	3.97	0.15
AL	422.79	64.56	2376.04	9275.85	3.40	0.11
AR	422.5	34.20	20160.64	12827.56	3.5	0
AZ	557.34	70.53	19165.35	3890.28	3.94	0.7
CA	2145.28	208.17	90677.34	9385.96	3.95	0.07
CO	227.37	16.52	25559.79	4358.61	3.88	0.05
CT	466.40	59.21	22550.09	4584.69	3.95	0.08
DE	74.56	6.23	33812.31	6348.26	3.85	0.04
FL	1540.88	175.30	26225.49	2004.91	3.53	0.12
GA	605.98	1.29	15553.46	707.22	3.49	0.04
HI	314.83	122.17	36367.82	9304.70	3.66	0.06
IA	185.63	11.86	19958.84	2627.21	4.02	0.05
ID	223.61	58.92	13694.89	1596.81	3.56	0.10
IL	967.55	44.42	52852.08	8762.64	4.02	0.06
IN	244.69	38.71	14926.57	5496.42	2.92	0.08
KS	133.34	26.98	4825.14	1067.05	3.76	0.03
KY	420.30	3.33	6938.47	2898.92	3.75	0
LA	592.76	105.34	15301.72	326.83	3.82	0.09
MA	890.23	30.50	46102.40	9251.79	3.14	0.04
MD	556.06	160.01	30649.39	7809.84	4.14	0.04
ME	159.62	15.70	9548.70	2073.58	3.14	0.04
MI	1112.61	187.45	60306.21	12390.81	3.875	0
MN	606.00	19.45	27757.52	1259.32	3.89	0.05
MO	452.13	82.94	27589.59	4621.61	3.80	0.25
MS	153.16	15.88	9108.57	194.54	3.51	0.08
MT	126.89	3.73	3188.84	401.13	3.72	0.04
NC	269.77	68.73	12577	462.13	3.07	0.16
ND	32.85	0.25	4406.72	1354.87	4.08	0.87
NE	216.95	12.42	10943.61	263.89	3.97	0.10
NH	147.29	10.83	92.08	1.95	2.50	0.014
NJ	1105.71	238.12	39109.03	6678.3	3.87	0.02
NM	191.00	7.12	0	0	3.75	0
NV	336.00	16.60	2993.62	134.93	3.13	0
NY	2972.11	403.42	66335.23	9724.11	4.34	0.07
OH	479.35	33.73	50314.52	6717.80	3.91	0.07
OK	282.22	20.46	33176.43	2914.01	3.24	0.04
OR	254.29	58.35	15258.76	3203.04	3.73	0.04
PA	2712.99	547.24	59911.14	12892.4	4.03	0.05
RI	276.08	556.99	9017.94	4925.20	2.98	0.15
SC	267.10	12.54	9472.87	202.33	3.23	0.10
SD	57.87	2.59	4924.16	871.67	3.27	0.89
TN	259.10	28.66	21122.27	1431.45	3.76	0.01
TX	1971.00	186.47	6529.242	0	3.34	0.22
UT	112.61	4.14	3826.205	1710.09	3.95	0.07
VA	407.14	26.34	16409.99	385.28	3.58	0.02
VT	52.31	11.40	8431.9	1164.92	2.66	0.11
WA	575.96	31.28	29062.58	8519.98	3.99	0.14
WI	667.66	67.19	40082.2	5403.97	3.80	0.10
WV	197.26	30.44	14057.14	3917.83	4.51	0.04
WY	31.76	10.26	3485.86	1377.94	3.88	0

Data on legislative staff and salaries. Note that Nebraska is excluded from models in the main text.

Table A3: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables Used in Regression Models

	Mean	Min	Max	Between State SD	Within State SD
Divided Government	0.49	0	1	0.28	0.43
Rule Review (Dichotomous)	0.87	0	1	0.32	0.15
Rule Review (Scale)	1.16	0	2	0.58	0.29
Veto-Proof Majority	0.25	0	1	0.37	0.23
Lower Chamber Polarization	1.43	0.46	3.10	0.47	0.14
Gubernatorial Institutional Power	3.67	1.38	4.63	0.41	0.17
Presidential Vote for Govn'r Party	0.49	0.27	0.73	0.05	0.08
Govn'r Previous Vote Share	0.58	0.36	0.82	0.04	0.06
Republican Governor	0.57	0	1	0.31	0.40
Governor Election Year	0.24	0	1	0.09	0.42
Term Limited	0.25	0	1	0.21	0.38
Ln(Legislative Staff)	5.84	2.94	8.15	1.05	0.19
Ln(Legislative Salary)	9.52	0	11.57	1.88	0.25
Ln(State Income Growth)	4.85	-9.2	18.74	0.92	2.61

Table A4: Divided Government and Moderating Variables Cross-Tabs

	Veto-Proof Majority		
Divided Government	0	1	Total
0	264	119	383
1	301	68	369
Total	565	187	752

	Rule Review (Continuous Measure)			
Divided Government	0	1	2	Total
0	32	227	124	383
1	64	209	96	369
Total	96	436	220	752

	Rule Review (Dichotomous)		
Divided Government	0	1	Total
0	32	351	383
1	64	305	369
Total	96	656	752



Figure A1: The y-axis shows the number of executive orders issued in a particular year. The light grey areas indicate periods of divided government. The dark grey areas indicate periods of divided government with veto-proof majorities in the legislature.



Figure A2: The y-axis shows the number of executive orders issued in a particular year. The light grey areas indicate periods of divided government. The dark grey areas indicate periods of divided government with veto-proof majorities in the legislature.

Table A5: Excluding Ceremonial and Pardon EOs - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.09**	-0.39**	0.28***
	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.09)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.57***		
	(0.18)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.27**	
		(0.12)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.22***
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.14	0.06	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.10	-0.12	0.05
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.05	0.04	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.25**	-0.28**	-0.27**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.65**	0.86**	0.84**
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.39	-0.39	-0.25
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Republican Governor	-0.17***	-0.19***	-0.27***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Governor Election Year	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Term Limited	-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.07	0.05	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.05	0.08	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth	-0.003	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.25	0.24	0.24
Log Likelihood	-2426.63	-2433.81	-2433.44
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: * p < .1, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A6: Excluding Disaster EOs - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.08*	-0.39	0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.10)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.62***		
	(0.22)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.26*	
		(0.15)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.19**
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.16	0.06	0.078
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.05	-0.06	0.11
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Rule Review	0.05	0.03	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.19*	-0.22**	-0.21**
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.83**	1.04***	1.02***
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.66	-0.63	-0.49
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Republican Governor	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.29***
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.16**	-0.17***	-0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.07	0.05	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.05	0.08	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2321.92	-2329.94	-2330.58
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A7: Including All EOs - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.08*	-0.33*	0.23**
	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.11)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.47**		
	(0.19)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.24**	
		(0.12)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.18**
			(0.09)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.08	0.01	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.11	-0.15	0.003
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.01	0.002	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.22**	-0.24**	-0.23**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.64**	0.80**	0.77**
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.23	-0.24	-0.10
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Republican Governor	-0.20***	-0.22***	-0.28***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Governor Election Year	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Term Limited	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.04	0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.24	0.24	0.24
Log Likelihood	-2482.62	-2486.95	-2487.57
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A8: Models Including Governor Fixed Effects - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	-0.04	-0.24	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.24		
	(0.21)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.12	
		(0.10)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.04
			(0.10)
Veto-Proof Majority	-0.18	-0.20*	-0.21*
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	0.33	0.29	0.34
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)
Rule Review	-0.090	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.43***	-0.43***	-0.42***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.85*	0.95**	0.96**
	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.54	-0.52	-0.53
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Republican Governor	-0.08	-0.09	-0.11
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Governor Election Year	-0.09*	-0.09*	-0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Term Limited	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.12	0.12	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.007	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.28	0.28	0.28
Log Likelihood	-2202.63	-2202.76	-2203.13
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include governor and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A9: Models That Exclude Particular States - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.11**	-0.43*	0.24**
	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.11)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.64***		
	(0.22)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.31**	
		(0.15)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.19**
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.16	0.05	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Lower Chamber Polarization	0.05	0.02	0.19
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Rule Review	0.09	0.05	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.31***	-0.34***	-0.32***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.81**	0.99***	0.96**
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.42	-0.40	-0.26
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.41)
Republican Governor	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.13**	-0.13***	-0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.14**	-0.16**	-0.17**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.15	0.14	0.17
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.02	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.15	0.14	0.14
Log Likelihood	-2133.25	-2141.18	-2143.81
N	687	687	687

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. GA and FL are omitted because these states treat executive orders differently than other states. Executive orders in these states are used to make executive appointments. KY, TX, and PA are omitted becase in these states executive orders have less legal certainty than in other states. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A10: Robustness Checks for Index of Gubernatorial Power - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.10**	-0.45*	0.23**
	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.10)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.62***		
	(0.23)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.31**	
		(0.14)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.19**
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.11	0.01	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.004	-0.04	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.06	0.04	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gubernatorial Institutional Power	-0.27**	-0.30***	-0.28***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.74**	0.95**	0.91**
	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.35	-0.36	-0.20
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Republican Governor	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.15**	-0.16***	-0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.060)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.08	0.06	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.03	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2365.20	-2371.74	-2374.73
N	748	748	748

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. In these models we exclude 1993 because of concerns over coding budget provisions in the Index of Gubernatorial power prior to and including that year. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A11: Models That Use Different Measures of Polarization - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Divided Government	-0.50*	-0.74***	-0.91***	-0.38**	-0.46***	-0.52**
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.22)
Upper Chamber Polarization	0.15					
	(0.36)					
Divided Government x Upper Chamber Polarization	0.29*					
	(0.17)					
Chamber Average Polarization		0.10				
		(0.48)				
Divided Government x Chamber Average Polarization		0.45***				
		(0.14)				
Chamber St. Dev. of Ideal Points			-0.46			
			(0.73)			
Divided Government x Chamber St. Dev. of Ideal Points			1.10***			
			(0.27)			
Lower Chamber Polarization (Campaign Finance)				0.47*		
				(0.28)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization				0.23**		
				(0.10)		
Upper Chamber Polarization (Campaign Finance)					-0.20	
					(0.19)	
Divided Government x Upper Chamber Polarization					0.29**	
					(0.11)	
Majority Party Heterogeneity						-0.19
						(0.77)
Divided Government x Majority Party Heterogeneity						1.63**
						(0.72)
Veto-Proof Majority	-0.12	-0.12	-0.04	-0.020	-0.040	-0.02
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Rule Review	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.03	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.28***	-0.30***	-0.28**	-0.40***	-0.34**	-0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.28	-0.33	-0.37	-0.14	0.03	-0.38
	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	1.68***	1.72***	1.46***	1.60***	1.65***	1.53***
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.43)
Republican Governor	-0.23**	-0.19**	-0.22***	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.28***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.14**	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Term Limited	-0.07	-0.08	-0.04	-0.07	-0.08	-0.0005
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.20	0.25
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.41**	0.40**	0.36*	0.36*	0.40**	0.45**
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Ln(State Income Growth)	0.001	0.001	-0.0002	0.004	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pseudo R^2	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Log Likelihood	-1324.53	-1356.94	-1324.58	-1460.50	-1457.02	-1328.84
N	412	424	416	455	453	416

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Limited to years 2004-2014 due to availability of polarization data. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A12: Including Third Party Governors - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.05	-0.47*	0.17
	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.11)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.60**		
	(0.24)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.30**	
		(0.14)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.17**
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.08	-0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	0.04	0.003	0.18
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.03	0.01	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.33***	-0.36***	-0.34***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.54	0.74*	0.70*
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.12	-0.13	0.02
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Republican Governor	-0.16***	-0.19***	-0.25***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Governor Election Year	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.09	0.07	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.02	0.05	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2424.40	-2430.55	-2433.64
N	766	766	766

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. In these models we include governors who do not identify with either of the two major parties. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A13: Models That Only Include States with Long (>10 Years) Panels - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.09**	-0.45*	0.23**
	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.10)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.62***		
	(0.23)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.31**	
		(0.14)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.18**
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.11	0.02	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.01	-0.04	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.06	0.04	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.27**	-0.31***	-0.29***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.74**	0.96**	0.91**
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.37	-0.37	-0.22
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.40)
Republican Governor	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.12**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.15**	-0.16***	-0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.08	0.06	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.03	0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2353.39	-2359.90	-2362.84
N	745	745	745

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. In these models we only include states with long (>10 Years) panels. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A14: Balanced Panel Models - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.10*	-0.60***	0.34***
	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.11)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.76***		
	(0.23)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.40***	
		(0.13)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.28***
			(0.09)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.07	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Lower Chamber Polarization	0.22	0.14	0.33
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Rule Review	0.08	0.08	0.15*
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.46***	-0.48***	-0.46***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.72**	1.06***	1.14***
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.40)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.04	0.01	0.23
	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.43)
Republican Governor	-0.17***	-0.20***	-0.32***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.11	-0.14**	-0.14**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.15	0.12	0.13
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.01	0.07	0.12
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Ln(State Income Growth)	0.005	-0.0005	-0.001
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pseudo R^2	0.15	0.14	0.14
Log Likelihood	-1660.47	-1666.12	-1668.67
N	532	532	532

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. Models include 38 states for which all variables and data are available in a complete balanced panel from 2000 to 2013. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A15: Models Including Additional Controls - NB Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged #EOs	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Divided Government	0.13**	-0.28	0.53***
	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.12)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.60***		
	(0.22)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.27**	
		(0.13)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.27***
			(0.07)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.07	-0.02	-0.004
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	0.04	0.07	0.28
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Rule Review	0.09	0.07	0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.31***	-0.35***	-0.36***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.69**	0.68*	0.47
	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.47	-0.54	-0.49
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Republican Governor	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.25***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Governor Election Year	-0.09*	-0.09*	-0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.10	0.08	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.05	0.08	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.004	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ln(State Expenditures)	0.48	0.43	0.47
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Govnr Party Size in Legislature	0.20	0.62*	1.14***
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.40)
Governor Years in Office	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2297.04	-2301.55	-2298.99
N	733	733	733

Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A16: Models with Ln(Number of EOs) as DV - OLS Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.08*	-0.50**	0.18*
	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.10)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.53***		
	(0.19)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.35**	
		(0.14)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.15*
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.14	0.01	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.19	-0.25	-0.035
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Rule Review	0.03	0.03	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.27***	-0.30***	-0.27***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.57*	0.82***	0.82**
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.46	-0.52	-0.34
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Republican Governor	-0.22***	-0.24***	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Governor Election Year	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.13**	-0.14**	-0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.11	0.08	0.11
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.05	0.08	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.73	0.73	0.72
Root MSE	0.48	0.49	0.49
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from OLS regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A17: Models with Different Coding of Divided Government - NB Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Divided Government	0.13**	-0.44	0.37***
	(0.05)	(0.29)	(0.11)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.65***		
	(0.23)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.31*	
		(0.17)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.30***
			(0.08)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.10	0.03	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.0003	0.02	0.16
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)
Rule Review	0.06	0.02	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.27**	-0.30***	-0.29***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.73**	0.96**	1.04***
	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.37)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.34	-0.26	-0.21
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)
Republican Governor	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Governor Election Year	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.16***	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.09	0.06	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.04	0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22
Log Likelihood	-2375.37	-2383.75	-2382.56
N	752	752	752

Coefficients reported from Negative Binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. In these models we code divided government as cases where BOTH chambers of the legislature are not controlled by the party of the governor. All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A18: Correlated Random Effects Models with Control for Majority Party Agenda Power

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Majority Party Agenda Power	0.29	0.40*	0.29
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Divided Government	0.11**	-0.42***	0.22**
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority	-0.63***		
	(0.13)		
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization		0.30***	
		(0.09)	
Divided Government x Rule Review			-0.18**
			(0.07)
Veto-Proof Majority	0.09	-0.02	-0.003
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.20	-0.30**	-0.13
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Rule Review	0.04	0.02	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Governor Institutional Power	-0.26**	-0.29**	-0.26**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	0.69**	0.83***	0.78***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.47	-0.42	-0.31
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Republican Governor	-0.21***	-0.24***	-0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Governor Election Year	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Term Limited	-0.12**	-0.13***	-0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.13	0.10	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ln(State Income Growth)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log Likelihood	-2407.07	-2412.88	-2416.22
N	724	724	724

Coefficients reported from Negative Binomial Correlated Random Effects regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. In these models we include an indicator of whether or not the state has high levels of majority party agenda power (Anzia and Jackman, 2012). All models include state and year fixed effects. Significance codes: *$p < .1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Table A19: Effects of Divided Government Under Alternate Conditions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Divided Government	0.25**	0.23**	-0.061	0.34**	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Divided Government x Veto-Proof Majority		-1.20**			-0.48**
		(0.48)			(0.16)
Divided Government x Lower Chamber Polarization			0.13		0.17*
			(0.10)		(0.09)
Divided Government x Rule Review				-0.24*	-0.19**
				(0.12)	(0.07)
Veto-Proof Majority		-0.06			0.15
		(0.20)			(0.10)
Lower Chamber Polarization	-0.50	-0.71	-0.01	-0.04	-0.13
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.24)	(0.61)	(0.20)
Rule Review	-0.56	-0.63**	-0.34**	-0.0002	0.14**
	(0.42)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)
Governor Institutional Power	1.75	2.96**	-0.41	-0.62*	-0.28**
	(1.52)	(1.26)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.12)
Presidential Vote for Govnr Party	1.49**	1.89***	0.28	0.76	0.78**
	(0.75)	(0.71)	(0.33)	(0.57)	(0.30)
Govnr Previous Vote Share	-0.14	-0.19	-0.31	-0.21	-0.38
	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.44)	(0.60)	(0.41)
Republican Governor	-0.22**	-0.18*	-0.32***	-0.19*	-0.19***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Governor Election Year	-0.18*	-0.18**	-0.19***	-0.12	-0.13 ***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Term Limited	0.07	0.13	-0.12**	-0.05	-0.14***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Ln(Legislative Staff)	0.91*	0.58*	0.03	0.22	0.04
	(0.49)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.09)
Ln(Legislative Salary)	0.57	-0.13	0.42**	0.24	0.07
	(0.47)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.42)	(0.08)
Ln(State Income Growth)	0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.002
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
LogLikelihood	-506.85	-708.25	-1244.69	-786.15	-2419.75
N	161	227	387	252	752

To assess the degree to which each statutory or non-statutory factor is sufficient for constraint, we examine each in isolation on subsets of the data where other factors that might aid the legislature in constraining the executive are absent or low. The first model examines the effect of divided government when none of these factors we identify is high, i.e. there are no veto-proof majorities, polarization is high, and review powers are below average. Model 2 examines cases where polarization is above average and review powers are below average. Here, we see that the effect of veto proof majorities remains. Model 3 subsets to observations where veto-proof majorities are absent and review powers are minimal. The effect of polarization positive, as expected, though statistically insignificant. Finally, Model 4, subsets on observations where polarization is high and veto- proof majorities are absent. Again, we see the effects suggested by the theory. Model 5 tests all three interactions in the same model. All of these results lend support to the idea that any of the constraining tools we examine (perhaps with the exception of polarization) may serve to constrain governors during divided government. Coefficients reported from negative binomial regression model, with robust standard errors clustered by governor in parentheses. Significance codes: $*p < .1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.



Figure A3: **Distribution of Polarization Under Divided and Unified Government**



Figure A4: **Coefficient sizes for models that omit one state.** Each point represents the coefficient from the model in Table 1, Model 2 in the main manuscript. However in each case we omit one state from that model. We see that in all cases the result remains statistically significant ($p < .1$) and substantively consistent across models, indicating that one particular state is not driving the results we report in the paper.



Figure A5: **Coefficient sizes for models that omit one state.** Each point represents the coefficient from the model to Table 1, Model 3 in the main manuscript. However in each case we omit one state from that model. We see that in nearly all cases the result remains statistically significant ($p < .1$) and substantively consistent across models, indicating that one particular state is not driving the results we report in the paper.



Figure A6: **Coefficient sizes for models that omit one state.** Each point represents the coefficient from the model in Table 2, Model 2 in the main manuscript. However in each case we omit one state from that model. We see that in all cases the result remains statistically significant ($p < .1$) and substantively consistent across models, indicating that one particular state is not driving the results we report in the paper.



Figure A7: Trends in Polarization by State - Difference in Party Medians (Shor and McCarty Data)



Figure A8: Trends in Polarization by State - Difference in Party Medians (Shor and McCarty Data)